It is common to have a slightly exaggerated sense of the significance of your own joys and miseries, but grand self-importance is rare. Louis XIV was grandly selfimportant. He believed that, when he consumed too much foie gras, France suffered gastric pain. When he took satisfaction from the construction of a new fountain in the grounds of Versailles, that feeling would settle over his natural kingdom -from the frigid, poxy docks of Brest to the steaming, cholera-ridden slums of Marseilles. For Louis, self-indulgence was a national mission.
This means that, although I may be no less chronically attentive to my own comfort than Louis was, my self-attention is internally problematic in a way that his was not.
Louis took his pleasures and pains to be especially important, so when he deliberated he discovered a neat harmony between egocentric-hedonistic considerations (of the form: 'overall, I will suffer less if I do __ rather than __') and considerations of the greater good (of the form: 'overall, things will be better if I do __ rather than __'). When I deliberate I discover no such harmony. I am continually faced with situations in which these considerations conflict, situations in which I can make the world better at a cost to my comfort, and myself more comfortable at a cost to the world.
That may seem a very obvious point. Of course people tend to be disproportionately preoccupied with their own comfort. Of course to be so preoccupied is not to be preoccupied with the greater good.
Can it be denied?
To get a grip on this question, let's consider the position of a peacemaker, a person whose desire for the kind of psychological harmony enjoyed by Louis leads her to be resolutely committed to the view that, for the most part, concern for one's own comfort and concern for the greater good align. The peacemaker notes that although most of us are not extreme egocentric-hedonists, caring only about our own pleasures and pains, we are at least mild egocentric hedonists -all other things being equal, we prefer that pain befall others rather than ourselves, and pleasure befall ourselves rather than others. The peacemaker then claims: (Harmony) Whenever a mild egocentric-hedonist favors a scenario in which she suffers less, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.
I have used some quasi-technical terms here, and they need to be glossed. What is it to for one thing to be 'simply better' than another? Let's just say what it isn't -not better in some qualified or three-way relational sense of the word, not better for me, or better for some purpose, or better in relation to a particular set of interests, but better period. What 'favor a scenario'? I mean the notion of 'favoring' to be understood quite broadly: one way to favor a scenario or state of affairs is to bring it about, another is just to desire that it obtain. So, according to (Harmony), it is not just that the actions of a mild egocentrichedonist bring about the good (when she brings about a situation in which she suffers less, she brings about a better maximal state of affairs), it is also that the desires of a mild egocentric hedonist align with the good (when she wants a situation in which she suffers less to come about, she wants a better maximal state of affairs to come about.)
Is the peacemaker's claim credible? Well, three seemingly insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of my believing it.
The Grounding Problem
First, if I am to believe it, I must take it to be true of me that when I enhance my own comfort the expense of other people, I am making for a better overall state of affairs.
So I must adopt a picture of the world in which my comfort makes an especially weighty contribution to the value simpliciter of a state of affairs. 
The Generalization Problem
Furthermore, if I am to argue, quite generally, that there is no conflict between the considerations that move a mild egocentric-hedonist and considerations of the greater good, it is not enough just to show that there is no conflict in my own case. I must show that any mild egocentric-hedonist, in favoring scenarios in which she suffers less, is favoring better maximal states of affairs. And it is very difficult to see how this can be so.
Call this the Generalization Problem.
To see the difficulty, imagine a situation in which my interests are at odds with someone else's. For example:
Competing for a Scarce Resource Jane and I are competing for a scarce resource. Jane will suffer less if she gets it. I will suffer less if I get it.
In this situation there seem to be two possible ways for things to go:
Possibility (1) CJH gets the resource Jane misses out and is happy and is miserable Possibility (2) CJH misses out Jane gets the resource and is miserable and is happy
Being a mild egocentric-hedonist, I favor (1) over (2). Being a mild egocentric-hedonist, Jane favors (2) over (1). But, if the notion of 'better simpliciter' is to remain coherent, it can't both be better simpliciter that the state of affairs represented by possibility (1) obtain and better simpliciter that the state of affairs represented by possibility (2) obtain.
So surely in this case at least one of us, in favoring the state of affairs in which we suffer less, is not favoring a simply better maximal state of affairs. 
The Problem of Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences
The third problem arises from the fact that, for me, caring about CJH's comfort and caring about my comfort do not always amount to the same thing. Given that I am broadly egocentric, and that I believe myself to be CJH, I want to promote my comfort and the comfort of CJH. But, given that I am broadly egocentric, the moment I ceased to believe that I was CJH, I would cease to care about him and continue to care about me.
There are imaginable situations in which this might happen:
After the Train-Crash I wake up in hospital, achy and bewildered, unable to remember who or where I am. I try to move, and find that my body is swathed in rigid plaster and my head is locked in a brace. I call for help and receive no reply. But, happily, some kind nurse has placed a television directly in front of me.
From it I learn that there has been a terrible train accident, that only two survivors, CJH and Joe Bloggs, have been pried from the wreckage, and that both have been taken to hospital and placed in full-body plaster casts, from which they are watching this very program on television. will suffer, when they will suffer and how much they will suffer. My preference for (1) over (2) is not a preference that the world be one way rather than another, but rather a preference that I be one way rather than another; it is, to use some jargon, an irreducibly de se preference, a preference with no de dicto content.
In light of the Grounding, Generalization and Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences problems, it appears that (Harmony) must be rejected and the peacemaker's project must be abandoned. The pressing question for ethicists to address is not whether the considerations that move a mild egocentric hedonist misalign with considerations of the greater good, but how we should respond when they do. And, sure enough, ethicists have been responding to some form or other of this question for a very long time.
That may seem like a compelling argument, but it relies upon some substantive and questionable assumptions about the metaphysics of the self. Perhaps the clearest way to bring this out is by looking at an analogous argument, to the conclusion that we cannot find harmony between considerations of the greater good and time-biased considerations. Of the many ways in which one might be time-biased, the two that have received most attention from philosophers 5 are hedonic bias toward the future (all things considered, I prefer that pains be past rather than future, and pleasures be future rather than past), and hedonic bias toward the near (all things considered, I prefer that pains be in the distant future rather than the immediate future, and pleasures be in the immediate future rather than the distant future). Everybody seems to some extent vulnerable to these kinds of bias. Wouldn't you prefer to be walking out of your dentist's office, with the pain in your tooth subsiding, than to be walking in, with the bulk of the pain still to come? Wouldn't you prefer the drill to be a week, rather than an hour away?
2: Time-Bias
Let's restrict our attention to pain. Someone who has these sorts of biases may
give them a role in her practical reasoning by taking considerations of the form 'there is less future pain in __ than __' and 'there is less near-future pain in __ than __' to support favoring one scenario over another. But obviously it would be hasty to take such considerations to provide the last word in practical deliberation, because sometimes they will misalign or conflict with considerations of the greater good. Sometimes, when you desire, or make it the case that there is less future or near future pain, you do not desire, or make it the case that things overall are better.
Why is this obvious? Once again it will be useful to consider a peacemaker, who wants to claim that time-biased considerations are in harmony with considerations of the greater good. The peacemaker is committed to:
(Harmony 2) Whenever a person favors a scenario in which there is less future, or nearfuture pain, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.
Can she really believe this? Three familiar obstacles stand in her way:
The Grounding Problem
First, she would have to adopt a metaphysical picture that gave her some grounds for thinking that future pains are in themselves worse than past pains, near-future pains in themselves worse than far-future pains. Her picture would need somehow to support the idea that Joan of Arc's suffering on the pyre matters less than mine at my next workout.
Here's a picture that would work:
Divine Novocain
At the dawn of creation God faced a problem: He would not allow himself physically to intervene in the course of history, for fear of compromising our freedom, but he wished to protect us from the evil consequences of that freedom. So he created Divine Novocain, a drug that dulls the qualitative aspect of suffering without inducing any physical changes in the sufferer. In the past he has administered this drug liberally, to all sufferers, pure and fallen, but now (confronted with famine, war and disease on a scale that even he could not have anticipated) he finds his stocks to be running low. He will be forced to ration. So he decides that he will administer none for a short while, and then gradually build up the doses, though never to their pre-2005 level.
This would do the trick. But it is mad. On any sane view, Joan of Arc's suffering is no less intense and no less significant for being past.
The Generalization Problem
Second, it is not enough for our peacemaker to show that considerations of the On Monday I prefer (1) to (2), while on Wednesday I prefer (2) to (1). But it can't both be better simpliciter that the maximal state of affairs represented by possibility (1) obtain, and that the maximal state of affairs represented by possibility (2) obtain. So on at least one of the two days considerations of the greater good do not align with future-biased considerations. On at least one of the two days, in favoring a scenario in which there is less future-pain, I am not favoring a better maximal state of affairs.
The Problem of Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences
Third, the peacemaker must face cases where time-bias leads us to have irreducibly egocentric preferences. Here is an example of such a case, where the preference is generated by bias toward the near 7 :
Waiting For My Painful Operation
Early in my life, clever doctors find that I have a rare genetic condition that will most likely cause me to contract cancer of the x (substitute whatever organ you feel most anxious about for x) in late middle-age. Happily, they As before, these three problems seem to be insurmountable, so it seems that the peacemaker must give up, and concede that no plausible metaphysical picture grounds general time-bias. Time-biased considerations do not always align with considerations of the greater good.
Time-Bias and the Metaphysics of Time
The argument above is structurally just like the argument from Section 1, the argument that egocentric considerations do not always align with considerations of the greater good. Is there anything wrong with it? Well, this time around we have at least some reason to suspect that there might be something wrong with it, because its conclusion is controversial. Certainly, many influential philosophers (including This involves making some substantive assumptions about the metaphysics of time.
Four-Dimensionalism
One vexed question in the metaphysics of time concerns the ontological status of past, present and future entities (moments, events, objects 
Alternatives to Four-Dimensionalism
There are several ways to accommodate this basic thought. Advocates of hyperkenesis 13 retain the block universe ontology, retain the idea that the world is a fourdimensionally extended space time manifold, but say that one moment has the interesting and unique property of being the present one. Which moment? Well, that changes as time goes by (think of a spot-light moving remorselessly along the block). Others imagine that the past exists but the future does not. The present is the outermost skin of a block that expands as time goes by. 14 Others imagine that the future exists but the past does not. The present is the outermost skin of a block that contracts as time goes by 15 . Others imagine that the future branches off in many directions while the past remains fixed. The present is the first point at which multiple branches split off from the bare tree-trunk of the past.
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Presentists 17 , meanwhile, hold that only present objects, events, moments exist (along, perhaps, with timeless things like gods and numbers). There are no past or future things.
13 See, for example, Schlesinger (1994) 14 This view may have origins in Aristotle. A contemporary version has been proposed by Tooley (1997) 15 Though many people have imagined this, I don't know of anyone who has endorsed it. Surprising, perhaps, because it seems uniquely well qualified to explain why the future matters and the past does not. 16 A view developed in McCall (1994) 17 The first and most famous presentist was Saint Augustine. For more up-to-date expositions of the view, see Bigelow (1996) and Zimmerman (1998) .
The best we can say is that it used to be the case that they existed, or it will be the case that they exist.
I think that presentism is by far the most coherent and philosophically defensible of these theories, but for present purposes that is beside the point. Egocentric Preferences problems by stipulating that, all other things being equal, states of affairs in which pain will occur are worse than states of affairs in which pain has occurred, and states of affairs in which pain will happen soon are worse than states of affairs in which pain will happen a long time from now.
Would this solve the Grounding Problem? Would the metaphysics somehow make it seem plausible that pain with the monadic property of being in the future is in itself more significant than pain with the monadic property of being in the past? Well, unless our peacemaker adopts the 'shrinking block' view, the metaphysics will not explain why past pains matter less than future pains. But maybe no explanation is needed.
If the peacemaker has a strong (though perhaps defeasible) conviction that future pain is intrinsically worse than past pain, the metaphysics does nothing to undermine her conviction.
3: Self-Bias and the Metaphysics of the Self
We can make peace between considerations of the greater good and time-biased considerations by adopting an appropriate metaphysical picture. Can we perform an analogous trick for egocentric considerations? What sort of picture would allow us to say that, when we favor scenarios in which we are better off, we favor simply better maximal states of affairs? Well, at a minimum the picture would have to imply that, in the After the Train Crash case, where I have an irreducibly egocentric preference, the two possibilities represent different ways for the world to be. But since these 'possibilities' differ only with respect to which of the injured parties is me, the picture would have to imply that this property, being me, somehow enters into states of affairs.
The analogy to four-dimensionalism and its denial should be clear. According to a widely accepted view of the self, if 'being me' and 'being other' are properties at all, then they are relational properties. CJH is me relative to CJH, other relative to Stalin. Stalin is me relative to Stalin, other relative to Lenin. And everybody is, in the relevant sense, on a par with respect to these properties -we are all me relative to ourselves, and other relative to everybody else. But according to the rather unorthodox view we would have to take, it would have to be the case that in any given maximal state of affairs, one and only one person has the non-relational property of being me. There is a unique I at the center (so to speak) of all that exists. After the Train Crash, I am comparing maximal states of affairs in which the thing with the monadic property of being me is in pain, with maximal states of affairs in which the thing with the monadic property of being me is free of pain.
Won't this turn out to be just another theory of the kind we considered in Chapter
One, another theory that says I am metaphysically unique? Well, yes, but if it is to solve the Generalization Problem then it needs to be considerably more subtle than those were.
Let's say that I am CJH, and Jane and I are each contemplating a state of affairs in which CJH suffers and Jane prospers. Our theory will need to explain why, although the state of affairs I am considering is one in which the thing with the intrinsic property of being me suffers, the state of affairs Jane is considering is not. And it will need to explain why, when Jane says 'I am going to prosper', the proposition expressed by her sentence is true. And the operators enable monadic tensers to take the some of the counter-intuitive sting out of their metaphysical commitments. For example, a presentist can say that, although Anne Boleyn does not exist, she is not like Santa Claus -because it was the case that (Ann Boleyn exists). Although my first grand-daughter does not exist, she is not like the boogeyman -because it will be the case that (my first grand-daughter exists). In general, for any thing that the four-dimensionalist believes to exist, the presentist can say that either it exists, or it will exist, or it has existed. The present is special, then, but not quite as special as it might at first have appeared.
The theory we are groping towards is going to need operators that, in a similar kind of way, allow us to make sense of self-referential sentences uttered by other people, and of the 'possibilities' that other people consider. Which operators we use will depend on the details of the theory we adopt. I will outline a theory 20 , call it Egocentric Presentism, which seems to me attractive and simple.
Egocentric Presentism -An Introduction
The best way to introduce this theory is with a story. Imagine that, in a fit of can be said for sure is that these things, whatever they are, reveal themselves at this, the first stage of the Cartesian exercise. They are present.
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Insight 2:
The present things are perceptual objects of a sentient being, CJH. CJH sees the telephone, painting and diary. CJH feels the itch.
Insight 3:
There are many, many sentient beings other than CJH, but their perceptual objects are not present. So as to talk about this interesting feature of CJH in an economical way, let's introduce some terms. Let 'present experiences' be short-hand for 'experiences whose objects are present.'
Let 'I' (in the nominative, 'me' in the accusative) be short-hand for the definite description 'the one with present experiences'. 
Semantics for a Logic of Points of View
Say that a subject world (henceforth an S-world) is a world in which there are functionally sentient creatures, the experiences of one and only one of which have the monadic property of being present.
At any such world, a set of atomic propositions hold true. Think of these as propositions having to do with the way things are, physically speaking, and propositions having to do with where the property of being present is instantiated. So, for example, at S HenryKissinger , a world physically identical to our own, but in which the experiences of Henry Kissinger are present, the following atomic propositions hold true:
'The sun orbits the moon' 'There are over ten billion functionally sentient animals'
'The person with present experiences was formerly Secretary of State' 'CJH's experiences are absent'
...etc. Now, let a system of S-worlds be a set of physically identical S-worlds such that for any functionally sentient creature in an S-world in the set, there is an S-world in the set in which that very creature has present experiences. And say that for any system of Sworlds there is a reflexive two-place access relation, the a-relation, defined over pairs of S-worlds in the system.
Here, for the sake of having an example to work with, is one system of S-worlds: S i S j means S i is a-related to S j .) So, in this system there are three S-worlds, S Tom , S Dick , and S Harry . They are all a-related to themselves, S Tom is a-related to S Dick (though not vice-versa), and S Dick is a-related to S Harry , (though not vice-versa).
Now we give truth conditions for sentences containing quantified point of view
operators in the following way:
Definition 1: From some point of view, from every point of view
 From some point of view (p)  is true at S K iff for some S J a-related to S K ,  p  is true at S J
 From every point of view (p)
 is true at S K iff for every S J a-related to S K ,  p  is true at S J So, for example, in the above system the proposition 'From some point of view (there are present queasy experiences)' is true at S Dick , because S Dick is a-related to S Harry and 'there are present queasy experiences' is true at S Harry . But it is false at S Tom , because S Tom is not a-related to S Harry , or to any other S-world at which 'there are present queasy experiences' is true.
And we give truth conditions for sentences containing operators of the form from H's point of view with the following definition schema: In this system all pairs of S-worlds are a-related. Call this a maximally interrelated system. So in this system 'Harry is conscious' is true at S Dick . Indeed, at every S-world it is true that every functionally sentient creature is conscious. There are no zombies in a maximally interrelated system. An egocentric presentist's attitude towards the S-world semantics, then, is very like a temporal presentist's attitude toward the standard four-dimensionalist semantics for tense logic. The temporal presentist says that only the present moment exists, that that is all there is. But for the purposes of understanding how tensed operators (operators like it was once the case that and it will always be the case that) work it may be useful to imagine that other moments exist, because propositions containing such operators are true or false of the present moment, as if it were part of a system of moments ordered by an earlier-later relation and truth conditions for propositions containing the operators were given by the rules of the four-dimensionalist semantics for tense logic.
It is also very like a modal fictionalist's attitude to the possible worlds semantics for modal logic. 22 The modal fictionalist believes that propositions containing modal operators (like it is possible that and it is necessary that) are true or false of the actual 22 See Rosen (1990) and onwards.
world as if it were part of a wider system of possible worlds ordered by an access relation, and truth conditions for the operators were given by the possible worlds semantics. But, says the fictionalist, we shouldn't let this fool us into thinking that a wider system really exists. Only the actual world exists.
Egocentric Presentism and Egoistic Considerations
If egocentric presentism is right then all that there is is an S-world. S-worlds are maximal states of affairs. So, as an egocentric presentist, I can make peace between considerations of the greater good and egocentric considerations by taking S-worlds in which I (short-hand for 'the one with present experiences', remember) suffer to be worse simpliciter than S-worlds in which I do not, and S-worlds in which I prosper to be better simpliciter than S-worlds in which I do not. On the one hand, I might think that considerations of the greater good support Jane favoring me getting the resource in just the way that they support me favoring me getting the resource. If Jane takes the resource for herself then she brings about an intrinsically worse state of affairs, and that counts against her doing so.
But there's another, better way to think about it. When I treat another person as a practical deliberator, and ask whether such-and-such considerations support her doing soand-so, I take her to be in a particular deliberative context, facing choices, options, and alternatives. This involves taking the deliberative context to be present. But since Jane's experiences are not, have never been, and will never be present, she is not, has never been, and will never be a practical deliberator in this sense, so 'My pain appears worse to me because I am more intimately acquainted with it. It is present to me in a way that the northern-most Russian spiller's pain is not. But he is more intimately acquainted with his pain. It is present to him in a way that mine is not.
Since our situations are really symmetrical, I find, on reflection, that I have no grounds for thinking that my pain is worse simpliciter than his pain.'
Well and good. But this humbling thought is not available to an egocentric presentist. For an egocentric presentist, the situations are not symmetrical. It's not that my pain is present to me and his present to him. Mine is present and his is absent. That is part of the way things are. So there is no reason to qualify or reassess my initial judgment.
The thought experiment does not, of course, commit an egocentric presentist to extreme egocentric-hedonism -the view that only present suffering has any significance at all. It identifies one factor that makes pleasure better and suffering worse. This is quite compatible with thinking that, in evaluating the significance of suffering, there are many other relevant factors to consider -factors such as the intensity of the suffering, the duration of the suffering, and the number of sufferers. It may be very tricky to give these factors precise weight. Is it better that there be one hour of hand-scalding or four hours of thumb-scalding? Is it better that there be one scalded hand or four scalded thumbs? 23 Is it better that there be absent suffering from hand-scalding or present suffering from thumbscalding? But some cases are less tricky. It is better that there be four hangnails than one crushed leg. It is better that there be present suffering from a hangnail than absent suffering of leg-crushing. After all, when there is an absent suffering from leg-crushing, and the victim is not a zombie, it is the case that from someone else's point of view (there is excruciating pain). And an egocentric presentist is free to take it that this matters, in just the way that a monadic tenser is free to take it that it matters that it will be the case that (there is excruciating pain). That is why empathy is instructive. So, for the mild egocentric-hedonist who adopts egocentric presentism, in some cases (e.g. comparing a state of affairs in which I suffer a hangnail with one in which someone else suffers a crushed leg) there will remain some conflict between egocentrichedonistic considerations and considerations of the greater good. But the residual conflict will not trouble me. For an egocentric presentist, egocentric-hedonistic considerations are not considerations of a special, distinctive kind, that count towards my favoring one state of affairs over another even when I recognize that the other is better simpliciter than the one. Once I have judged that it is better that there be a present hangnail than absent legcrushing, it isn't as if there is some further consideration -'but the hangnail will be mine!' -that has independent force. I have already accounted for the presence of the hangnail, the fact that it is mine, in my judgment about which state of affairs is better simpliciter. So when egocentric-hedonistic considerations and considerations of the greater good conflict the former just fall away. 
